This book offers an in-depth analysis of the failures of the UK’s defence acquisition and procurement process, and the broader ramifications for the UK’s national security. The UK’s record on defence acquisition and procurement constitutes one of the biggest British public policy scandals of the modern era - albeit one largely concealed from voters and taxpayers. Its recent history is characterised by high levels of incompetence, weak governance and a lack of proper accountability; defects compounded by a ‘conspiracy of optimism’ that things will turn out differently simply through the power of wishful thinking. Focusing largely on events since 1997, this book provides the first detailed assessment of the failures of this period and compares them with the performance of overseas counterparts, such as the United States, France, Australia and Canada. By focusing on a wide variety of expensive and technically disastrous case studies across all services and domains, the book seeks to highlight some of the key lessons that recent history has provided about the complex network of interrelated factors that have led to so many disappointments and failures in British military procurement. As such it demonstrates how these problems have affected UK national security and its military and diplomatic standing in a volatile and uncertain world. This book will be of much interest to students of British politics, defence studies, strategic studies and International Relations
